

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 19 October, 1943 — File No. 14

(2)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]				
DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	telegram	Amemb Jidda to Sec State	10/19/73	B
2	telegram	Amemb Madrid to Sec State	10/19/73	B
3	telegram	USMISSION NATO to Sec State	10/19/73	B
4	telegram	SecState to Amemb Tel Aviv	10/19/73	D
5	reports	Situation Reports	10/19/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE NSC			BOX NUMBER 1175	
FOLDER TITLE (2)				

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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S/S (3)
 S/S-I
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 AF/N
 /PRS
 A/WLG
 M
 NR
 H (LDX)
 OD (LDX)
 IA (LDX)
 SA (LDX)
 A/HO
 /CCT
 CA
 Y
 II

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 45

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1800 EDT, Oct. 19, 1973

Military Situation

Syrian Front: The spokesman for the IDF at 1815 (local time) today announced that Jordanian and Syrian armored forces had again attacked the IDF but again been thrown back. Syrian spokesman claimed success in stopping Israeli armored attacks.

Egyptian Front: The spokesman for the IDF at his noon briefing announced that the IDF Task Force west of the Canal had now gotten 300 tanks across and mounted a three pronged offensive, one in the direction of Cairo, another group is heading southwest to cut main Egyptian supply lines from Cairo to Suez, the third force is heading south to destroy missile and anti-aircraft sites which have been hampering Israeli air activity over Sinai.

Counterattacking Egyptian troops were reportedly repulsed with heavy losses. The Israeli press reports that the road to Cairo is "wide open" and most of the "missile belt" has been destroyed. Cairo reports that fierce fighting in Sinai continues.

Diplomatic Situation

Department spokesman indicated at the noon briefing that following Kosygin's Cairo visit he expected communications and exchanges to intensify between Moscow and Washington. He said Secretary of State Kissinger may

SECRET

GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981


SECRET

2

delay his departure for China to the middle of next week because of the Middle East situation.

Washington

President Nixon sent a request to the Congress for 2.2 billion dollars in emergency military aid for Israel. Appropriations Chairman Mahon expressed doubt as to the need for new legislation, suggesting that there is adequate authority under existing law. Concern was also voiced in the Congress about the possibility of American troop involvement.



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TELEGRAM

SECRET 583.

PAGE 01 STATE 207553

3

44
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 1031 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/CE:RWBECKER:BCM
APPROVED BY EUR - MR. STABLER
EUR/CE - J BECKER
EUR/CE - MR GEORGE
SY - MR FUSELIER
S/CCT - MR GATCH
NEA - MR ATHERTON
S/S - MR. GAMMON

0 191716Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION BERLIN IMMEDIATE

027184

S E C R E T STATE 207553

EXDIS

F.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, WB, GW
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL TERRORIST THREAT US INSTALLATIONS
AND PERSONNEL

1. DECISION TO RESUPPLY ISRAEL IN PART FROM US STOCKS IN FRG HAS BEEN WIDELY RUMORED ALREADY AND IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE IN NEXT FEW DAYS ON CONFIRMED BASIS, ALTHOUGH DETAILS WILL BE WITHHELD TO EXTENT POSSIBLE. WHEN THIS OCCURS WE MUST EXPECT THAT US INSTALLATIONS AND PERSONNEL IN THE FRG AND WEST BERLIN WILL BECOME LOGICAL AND EASILY IDENTIFIABLE TARGETS FOR POSSIBLE ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITH PLO OFFICE IN EAST BERLIN LEADING CANDIDATE AS BASE OF OPERATIONS.

2. PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO ALERT POSTS TO POTENTIAL

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ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
~~KENNEDY~~ _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
~~RATLIFF~~ _____
RONDON _____
SONENDES _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

P/B



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 207553

THREAT. POSTS SHOULD ASSESS THREAT AND POSSIBLE TARGETS, TAKING SUCH PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES ON OWN OR IN CONSULTATION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS SEEMS WARRANTED. IN ADDITION TO US INSTALLATIONS AND OFFICIAL PERSONNEL, POSTS MIGHT WISH CONSIDER WHETHER ANY PARTICULAR EXTRA PROTECTION NEEDED AND FEASIBLE IN WEST BERLIN FOR LEADERS OR INSTITUTIONS WHICH MIGHT LOGICALLY BE THREATENED BY TERRORISTS, SUCH AS PRIVATE AMERICANS OR WEST BERLIN JEWISH INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS, OR INSTALLATIONS.

3. REQUEST BONN'S VIEWS RE REPEATING THIS MESSAGE TO OTHER INTRA-FRG ADDRESSEES. KISSINGER



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 423

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05577 191545Z

44

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

USSS-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

ACDA-19 IO-14 OMB-01 AF-10 DRC-01 /145 W

026152

O 191440Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9776
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
USUN IMMEDIATE 2636
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5577

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, O JO, SU
SUBJECT: SOV AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON KING

REF: AMMAN 5575

SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD NOTHING TO SAY. HE WAS ON
A FISHING EXPEDITION. KING TOLD HIM TO GET A CEASEFIRE.
BROWN

CONFIDENTIAL
23

EMBARGO FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 3:00 P.M., EDT

OCTOBER 19, 1973

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am today requesting that the Congress authorize emergency security assistance of \$2.2 billion for Israel and \$200 million for Cambodia. This request is necessary to permit the United States to follow a responsible course of action in two areas where stability is vital if we are to build a global structure of peace.

For more than a quarter of a century, as strategic interests of the major powers have converged there, the Middle East has been a flashpoint for potential world conflict. Since war broke out again on October 6, bringing tragedy to the people of Israel and the Arab nations alike, the United States has been actively engaged in efforts to contribute to a settlement. Our actions there have reflected my belief that we must take those steps which are necessary for maintaining a balance of military capabilities and achieving stability in the area. The request I am submitting today would give us the essential flexibility to continue meeting those responsibilities.

To maintain a balance of forces and thus achieve stability, the United States Government is currently providing military material to Israel to replace combat losses. This is necessary to prevent the emergence of a substantial imbalance resulting from a large-scale resupply of Syria and Egypt by the Soviet Union.

The costs of replacing consumables and lost equipment for the Israeli Armed Forces have been extremely high. Combat activity has been intense, and losses on both sides have been large. During the first 12 days of the conflict, the United States has authorized shipments to Israel of material costing \$825 million, including transportation.

Major items now being furnished by the United States to the Israeli forces include conventional munitions of many types, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, artillery, crew-served and individual weapons, and a standard range of fighter aircraft ordnance. Additionally, the United States is providing replacements for tanks, aircraft, radios, and other military equipment which have been lost in action.

Thus far, Israel has attempted to obtain the necessary equipment through the use of cash and credit purchases. However, the magnitude of the current conflict coupled with the scale of Soviet supply activities has created needs which exceed Israel's capacity to continue with cash and credit purchases. The alternative to cash and credit sales of United States military materials is for us to provide Israel with grant military assistance as well.

The United States is making every effort to bring this conflict to a very swift and honorable conclusion, measured in days not weeks. But prudent planning also requires us to prepare for a longer struggle. I am therefore requesting that the Congress approve emergency assistance to Israel in the amount of \$2.2 billion. If the conflict moderates, or as we fervently hope, is brought to an end very quickly, funds not absolutely required would of course not be expended.

(MORE)

I am also requesting \$200 million emergency assistance for Cambodia. As in the case of Israel, additional funds are urgently needed for ammunition and consumable military supplies. The increased requirement results from the larger scale of hostilities and the higher levels of ordnance required by the Cambodian Army and Air Force to defend themselves without American air support.

The end of United States bombing on August 15 was followed by increased communist activity in Cambodia. In the ensuing fight, the Cambodian forces acquitted themselves well. They successfully defended the capital of Phnom Penh and the provincial center of Kampong Cham, as well as the principal supply routes. Although this more intense level of fighting has tapered off somewhat during the current rainy season, it is virtually certain to resume when the dry season begins about the end of the year.

During the period of heaviest fighting in August and September, ammunition costs for the Cambodian forces were running almost \$1 million per day. We anticipate similar average costs for the remainder of this fiscal year. These ammunition requirements, plus minimum equipment replacement, will result in a total funding requirement of \$380 million for the current fiscal year, rather than the \$180 million previously requested. To fail to provide the \$200 million for additional ammunition would deny the Cambodian Armed Forces the ability to defend themselves and their country.

We remain hopeful that the conflict in Cambodia be resolved by a negotiated settlement. A communist military victory and the installation of a government in Phnom Penh which is controlled by Hanoi would gravely threaten the fragile structure of peace established in the Paris agreements.

I am confident that the Congress and the American people will support this request for emergency assistance for these two beleaguered friends. To do less would not only create a dangerous imbalance in these particular arenas but would also endanger the entire structure of peace in the world.

RICHARD NIXON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

October 19, 1973

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Department of State

SECRET

COPY 7 OF 8 COPIES

War

TELEGRAM

Z 192326Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN FLASH 8247
BT
SECRET STATE 208154

CONTROL 5744Q
RECD: 19 OCT 73 11PM

War

MODIS
CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652 - XGDS 21
TAGS: PFOR, IR
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE SHAH

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO HIS IMPERIAL
MAJESTY FROM THE SECRETARY.

2. BAGIN TEXT:

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY,

I WANT YOU TO KNOW VERY PRIVATELY THAT I SHALL
BE LEAVING TONIGHT FOR TALKS IN MOSCOW ON THE CURRENT
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I HAVE MADE THIS
DECISION IN RESPONSE TO A SOVIET SUGGESTION DURING
THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM THIS AFTERNOON
AND IN LIGHT OF THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE SO FAR.
THEY AND WE AGREE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOW INTENSIFY
OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS THROUGH DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN
MYSELF AND THE SOVIET LEADERS.

MY OBJECTIVES DURING THESE TALKS WILL REMAIN WHAT
THEY HAVE BEEN FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CURRENT CRISIS.
WE SEEK AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE FIGHTING ON A BASIS
THAT WILL MAKE POSSIBLE EARLY PROGRESS TOWARD A FINAL
JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN YOUR AREA.

MY TRIP TO MOSCOW WILL BE ANNOUNCED AFTER I HAVE
LEFT WASHINGTON. I AM SENDING YOU THIS MESSAGE
BECAUSE I FELT, IN VIEW OF THE WARM RELATIONS THAT
HAVE BEEN TRADITIONAL BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, THAT
YOU SHOULD BE AMONG THE FEW TO KNOW OF IT IN ADVANCE.
SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END TEXT.

KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.
CLEARANCES: NE:MR.SISCO
S/S:MR.PICKERING

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
S:MR.EAGLEBURGER

SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

Q 192024Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 207740

CONTROL: 5691Q
RECD: 19 OCT 73 5PM

Wm

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, GW
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY DISCUSSES ME SITUATION WITH FRG
AMBASSADOR

1. IN CALL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY AMBASSADOR VON STADEN SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED IN THE NATO CONSULTATIONS OF THE PAST TWO DAYS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THE RENEWED WARFARE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. AMBASSADOR KRAFF HAD OBSERVED THAT DETENTE WAS INDIVISIBLE; THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IN THE MIDDLE EAST COULD NOT REMAIN WITHOUT EFFECT ON NATO. THE VISIBLE RESOLVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO PRESERVE THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS WELCOME EVIDENCE OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE IN EUROPE AS WELL. IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT, FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE.

2. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WANTED TO APPROACH US DIRECTLY, SINCE HE HAD FOUND THE RATHER OPTIMISTIC STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY MR. WARREN AND THE VERY SERIOUS APPROACH BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTORY. IT WOULD HELP THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO ADOPT THE RIGHT POSITION IF THE GERMANS WERE BETTER INFORMED ABOUT THE SITUATION.

3. DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH RESPONDED BY EXPRESSING OUR THANKS TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND TO FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL FOR THE HELPFUL RESPONSE TO OUR NEED TO TAKE SOME EQUIPMENT OUT OF GERMANY IN RESUPPLYING ISRAEL; THIS SAVED US CONSIDERABLE TIME. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY STRESSED THAT WE HAD STARTED OUR RESUPPLY OPERATION ONLY AFTER THE SOVIETS HAD LAUNCHED THEIR OWN MASSIVE RESUPPLY OPERATION TO THE ARAB BELLIGERENTS. DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT, TANKS AND OTHER MATERIEL, AND CONSUMPTION OF AMMUNITION HAD BEEN VERY HEAVY ON BOTH SIDES. TO PERMIT RESUPPLY TO THE ARABS WITHOUT RESUPPLYING ISRAEL WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO PERMITTING THE DEFEAT OF ISRAEL, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD GRAVELY WEAKEN OUR POSITION

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- STATE 207740, OCT 19

4. WE WERE TRYING TO KEEP OPEN OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH ALL PARTIES INVOLVED AND TO WORK FOR A PERMANENT PEACE SETTLEMENT. WHILE WE COULD NEVER BE SURE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, WE BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE GOOD PROSPECTS FOR GETTING A NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED FOLLOWING THE CEASE FIRE LOOKING TOWARDS A PERMANENT PEACE SETTLEMENT, BECAUSE THE SOVIETS--LIKE EVERYONE ELSE--HAD MUCH TO LOSE BY ALLOWING THE TEMPO OF HOSTILITIES TO INCREASE. SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN SEEKING DETENTE WOULD BE LOST THEREBY, AND THESE OBJECTIVES WERE VERY IMPORTANT TO MOSCOW--ACCEPTANCE OF BOUNDARIES, INCREASED TRADE, TRANSFER OF BADLY NEEDED WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE LIKE. HENCE WE THINK THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING A CEASE FIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MOVING TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

5. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT PRESIDENT SADAT'S SPEECH, MR. RUSH COMMENTED THAT WE INTERPRET IT AS SHOWING EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL SOLUTION BUT ITS SUBSTANCE, EMPHASIZING WITHDRAWAL TO THE '67 BORDERS IS UNATTAINABLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE TALKS AT THE WHITE HOUSE WITH THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING AND WERE CONDUCTED IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT AND HAD THREATENED NO ARAB ACTION AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

6. ASKED BY AMBASSADOR VON STADEN FOR OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT BOTH SIDES HAD SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES, BUT ARAB LOSSES HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLY HEAVIER THAN THOSE SUSTAINED BY ISRAEL. GIVEN THE POPULATION OF ISRAEL, IT MUST BE KEPT IN MIND HOW SIGNIFICANT ISRAELI CASUALTIES WERE TO THE COUNTRY'S ABILITY TO MAKE WAR. ISRAEL HAD RECLAIMED THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, BUT THE SYRIAN ARMY WAS NOT IN ROUT AND CONTINUED TO FIGHT EFFECTIVELY. IN THE SUEZ PENINSULA, THE SITUATION WAS UNCLEAR, WITH CONFLICTING REPORTS CONCERNING THE ISRAELI EFFORT TO DESTROY THE EGYPTIAN SAM SITES. THE EGYPTIANS HAD PENETRATED 10-12 KILOMETERS BEYOND THE CANAL, UNDER A HEAVY SAM UMBRELLA WHICH MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT AND COSTLY FOR THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE TO DESTROY THE EGYPTIAN FORCES. IT WOULD TAKE A MAJOR ISRAELI EFFORT TO PUSH THE EGYPTIANS BACK ACROSS THE SUEZ CANAL. IN SUM,

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Department of State
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PAGE -3- STATE 207740, OCT 19

NEITHER SIDE WAS DEFEATED; NEITHER SIDE WAS IN ROUT, ACCORDING TO OUR LATEST REPORTS. BOTH SIDES HAD THE CAPABILITY TO CONTINUE FIGHTING FOR ANOTHER SEVERAL WEEKS, BUT THEIR ECONOMIES ALREADY WERE SEVERELY STRAINED BY THE WAR.

7. REFERRING TO A LIST OF MEASURES THE ALLIANCE MIGHT TAKE, WHICH HAD BEEN SUGGESTED IN BRUSSELS BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD, THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER THESE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS EXAMPLES OF WHAT MIGHT BE DONE IF THE SITUATION SHOULD DETERIORATE FURTHER, OR WHETHER AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD PROPOSED THAT THE ALLIANCE TAKE SUCH MEASURES NOW.

8. IN REPLY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT THE SOVIETS COULD ADOPT THREE POSSIBLE POSITIONS: (A) THE SOVIETS COULD SEEK A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN THE SPIRIT OF EAST-WEST DETENTE; (B) THEY COULD ADOPT AN AMBIVALENT STANCE; OR (C) THEY COULD REFUSE TO BE FORTHCOMING AND RISK A HARD CONFRONTATION. SHOULD THEY TAKE THE FIRST POSITION, OBVIOUSLY NO COUNTERMEASURES WOULD BE CALLED FOR. IN THE SECOND CASE, WE MIGHT TAKE SOME STEPS, WITHOUT BEING TOO HARSH. SHOULD THE SOVIETS ADOPT THE THIRD, UN-COMPROMISING STANCE, WE WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE MANY, IF NOT ALL, OF THE MEASURES MENTIONED BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD. AT PRESENT WE JUDGED THE SOVIE POSITION TO LIE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND POSSIBILITIES. NONETHELESS, WE FELT THAT WE SHOULD NOT MOVE TOO FAST AT PRESENT IN CSCE AND OTHER ENDEAVORS TO ADVANCE DETENTE.

KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: EUR/CE:LHEICHLER

APPROVED BY: D:MR.RUSH

CLEARANCES: EUR/CE:MR.GEORGE
S/S:MR.MILLER

NEA:MR.SISCO
EUR:MR.SPRINGSTEEN

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Department of State

SECRET

COPY 7 OF 8 COPIES

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 5747Q
RECD: 19 OCT 73 11 PM

Z 192326Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4972
BT
SECRET STATE 208155

MODIS/CHEROKEE

E.C. 11652 - XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO KING HUSSEIN

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN
FROM THE SECRETARY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY,

I WANT YOU TO KNOW VERY PRIVATELY THAT I SHALL BE
LEAVING TONIGHT FOR TALKS IN MOSCOW ON THE CURRENT
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I HAVE MADE THIS DECISION
IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET URGING DURING THE COURSE
OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM THIS AFTERNOON AND IN LIGHT
OF THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE SO FAR. THEY AND WE AGREE
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOW INTENSIFY OUR DIPLOMATIC
EFFORTS THROUGH DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN MYSELF AND THE
SOVIET LEADERS.

MY OBJECTIVES DURING THESE TALKS WILL REMAIN AS I
HAVE DESCRIBED THEM TO YOUR MAJESTY IN OUR RECENT
CORRESPONDENCE. WE SEEK AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE FIGHTING
ON A BASIS THAT WILL MAKE POSSIBLE EARLY PROGRESS TOWARD
A FINAL, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN YOUR AREA. IT IS
NOT EXPECTED THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED ON A
FINAL AGREEMENT, AND I CAN ASSURE YOU AS I SAID
IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU LAST NIGHT, THAT YOUR INTERESTS
WILL BE FULLY PROTECTED.

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE -2- STATE 208155, OCT 19

MY TRIP TO MOSCOW WILL BE ANNOUNCED AFTER I HAVE LEFT WASHINGTON. I AM SENDING YOU THIS MESSAGE BECAUSE I FELT, GIVEN THE CLOSE AND SPECIAL TIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND YOUR COURAGEOUS AND STATESMANLIKE EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES FROM WIDENING, THAT YOU SHOULD BE AMONG THE FEW TO KNOW OF IT IN ADVANCE. SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER.

END TEXT. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES: S:MR.EAGLEBURGER
S/S:MR.PICKERING

NEA:MR.SISCO

SECRET

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Department of State

SECRET

WH 10
ww
TELEGRAM

0 191612Z OCT 73 5 6 3 3 Q
FM AMEMBASSY BONN 19 OCT 73 Z17 08
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8184
BT
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 15209

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: GW, US, XF, PFOR
SUBJECT: INITIAL GERMAN REACTION TO US MID-EAST PRESEN-
TATION AT NATO

REF: STATE 205850

BEGIN SUMMARY: HIGH LEVEL OCTOBER 12 FONOFF MEETING, CHAIRED BY ACTING FONMIN FRANK, ENGAGED IN LENGTHY REVIEW OF US PROPOSALS AT NATO (REFTEL) AND CONCLUDED THAT FRG NEEDED DETAILED FULLER PRESENTATION ON AMERICAN POLICY AND TACTICS AS WELL AS ON CURRENT DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SITUATION BEFORE DETERMINING BONN'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT PROPOSED US POLICY. FONOFF MEETING NOTED LACK OF SUPPORT FOR US FROM OTHER NATO ALLIES AND WISH OF EC-9 BOTH TO PROTECT OWN INTERESTS AND TO HOLD BACK POSSIBLE EC INITIATIVE AS FUTURE DIPLOMATIC OPTION. INITIAL REACTION TO SPECIFIC US PROPOSALS WAS RESERVED, WITH SEVERAL OFFICIALS ARGUING THAT EAST/WEST DETENTE POLICIES SHOULD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED AND THAT CSCE SLOW-DOWN WOULD NOT IMPRESS SOVIETS BUT MIGHT ENDANGER MBFR OPENING. IN SUM, THE EMPHASIS WAS THAT FACTFINDING MUST PRECEDE POLICY DECISIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. RELIABLE FONOFF SOURCES HAVE BRIEFED US ON THE SENIOR LEVEL FONOFF MEETING HELD OCTOBER 18 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF ACTING FONMIN FRANK. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH A REPORT BY FRG NATO AMBASSADOR KRAFF, WHO ASSERTED THAT THE US POSITION HAD LEFT AN UNFORTUNATE IMPRESSION ON ALL RPT ALL OF WASHINGTON'S 14 NATO ALLIES. MORE SPECIFICALLY, KRAFF REPORTEDLY SAID, BASED ON SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS AT NATO, THAT HE KNEW OF NO NATO DEL PRESENTLY PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE US REQUEST TO "SLOW DOWN DETENTE". THE MAIN REASON FOR THIS INITIAL EUROPEAN REACTION, CONTINUED KRAFF, WAS THE FEELING THAT THE US HAD DEMANDED EUROPEAN SUPPORT WITHOUT PROVIDING ITS ALLIES ANY OF THE FACTS CONCERNING THE CURRENT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-2- BONN 15209, SECTION 1 OF 2, OCT 19, NODIS

DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SITUATION OR WHAT POLICY THE US ACTUALLY WAS PURSUING.

2. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES, SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION AT THE FONOFF MEETING WAS DECISIVELY INFLUENCED BY THE GENERAL FEELING THAT BONN WAS BEING ASKED TO SUPPORT POLICY GOALS CONCERNING THE DETAILS AND PREMISES OF WHICH IT HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED. IN PARTICULAR, THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AROSE AT THE MEETING:

--WHAT IS THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE SO FAR TO THE ARABS AND OF THE US TO ISRAEL?

--WHAT ROLE DID THE USSR PLAY IN INDUCING OR ENCOURAGING THE INITIAL ARAB ATTACKS?

--WHAT IS THE PRECISE US UNDERSTANDING OF THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION AND OF POSSIBLE FUTURE ARAB, ISRAELI AND SOVIET INTENTIONS?

--WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE US-SOVIET DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE?

--WHAT WAS KOSYGIN ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH IN CAIRO?

--WHAT ARE THE ULTIMATE ISRAELI WAR GOALS AND IS THE US PRESSING TEL AVIV DIPLOMATICALLY? IN WHAT WAY?

--ARE THE US AND USSR CONSIDERING A GUARANTEE OF ISRAELI FRONTIERS, AND WHAT FRONTIERS?

--THE FONOFF ARABISTS EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN THE "RESTRICTED WAR AIMS" DESCRIBED BY SADAT. WHAT IS THE US REACTION?

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SECRET

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19 OCT 73 Z17 08

3. OUR SOURCES CITED THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, WHICH AROSE AT THE FONOFF MEETING, TO MAKE THE POINT THAT AMERICA'S ALLIES WISHED TO BE HELPFUL BUT STRONGLY BELIEVED THEY SHOULD, TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE, BE TAKEN FULLY INTO WASHINGTON'S CONFIDENCE IN THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SITUATION. OUR SOURCES SAID THEY SAW LITTLE PROSPECT THAT THE ALLIES WOULD GIVE THE US THE SUPPORT IT IS SEEKING WITHOUT SUCH INFORMATION.

4. OUR SOURCES STATED THE RESTRAINED FRG AND OTHER ALLIED POSITIONS REFLECT CONCERN THAT US PROPOSALS COULD JEOPARDIZE THE ENTIRE RANGE OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICIES. FURTHER, THE WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE SOME INTERESTS DIFFERING FROM THOSE OF THE US IN THE MID-EAST. BESIDES THE OBVIOUS WEST EUROPEAN CONCERN OVER ENERGY SUPPLIES, OUR SOURCES NOTED EC ASSOCIATION ARRANGEMENTS WITH MAGRHEB COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL AND VARIOUS EMPHASES IN EC-9 POLICIES TOWARD THE MID-EAST. OUR SOURCES SAY THE EC-9 COUNTRIES ALSO HARBOR THE HOPE THAT THEY MIGHT AT SOME FUTURE POINT MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE IN THE MID-EAST AND THAT THIS OPTION WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IF ALL-OUT SUPPORT NOW AFFORDED TO US POSITION.

5. IN THE FONOFF MEETING, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIFIC US PROPOSALS VIS-A-VIS USSR. IN PARTICULAR, OUR SOURCES NOTED THAT ANY SLOW DOWN AT CSCE WOULD IN EFFECT INVOLVE SUSPENSION BECAUSE THE GENEVA TALKS PRESENTLY ARE MOVING SO SLOWLY. FURTHER, GIVEN SOVIET FRUSTRATION TO DATE IN CSCE, OUR SOURCES SUSPECTED THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE ABLE TO LIVE VERY WELL WITH SUSPENSION, CLAIMING CREDIT FOR HAVING CONVENED THE JUNE MINISTERIAL AND NOW LETTING LOOSE PROPAGANDA BLASTS AT THE WEST FOR DISRUPTING THE CONFERENCE. OUR SOURCES COMMENTED THAT BREAKING OFF CSCE WOULD NOT ONLY ANTAGONIZE SMALL WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, EAST EUROPEANS AND NON-ALIGNED STATES, BUT ALSO COULD GRAVELY ENDANGER THE OCTOBER 30

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-2- BONN 15209, SECTION 2 OF 2, OCT 19, NODIS

OPENING DATE FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. AS TO US PROPOSALS REGARDING ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH EAST, OUR SOURCES NOTED THAT FRG AGREEMENTS WITH USSR AND EES LOOK TOWARD MIDDLE TERM SO SUCH THREATS WOULD NOT BE VERY EFFECTIVE AT THIS TIME. EACH WESTERN COUNTRY COULD, OF COURSE, WARN THE SOVIETS REGARDING POSSIBLE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF MID-EAST SITUATION ON THEIR OVER-ALL BILATERAL RELATIONS.

6. IN CLOSING, OUR SOURCES SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD THE CONTINGENCY CHARACTER OF THE PROPOSED US MEASURES, BUT SAID THIS CHARACTER MIGHT USEFULLY BE EMPHASIZED IN NATO. THE GERMAN OFFICIALS EMPHASIZED THEIR WISH TO BE HELPFUL BUT SAID THE FIRST STEP WOULD BE FOR THE US TO PROVIDE ITS ALLIES IN CONFIDENCE WITH THE FULLEST POSSIBLE APPRECIATION OF OVER-ALL AMERICAN POLICY GOALS AND TACTICS AS WELL AS INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SITUATION.

7. EMBOFF PRESENTED US VIEW OF SERIOUSNESS OF ALLIES' HAVING A COMMON POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIETS, EES AND ARABS AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE. HE NOTED THAT PRESS OF TIME MADE IT DIFFICULT TO HAVE A PROLONGED NATO DISCUSSION OF POLICY GOALS AND TACTICS TO ACHIEVE THEM. THESE ARGUMENTS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE MUCH IMPACT ON OUR CONTACTS, HOWEVER. WE UNDERSTAND KRAPF HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEEK INFORMATION FROM US ALONG THE LINES REPORTED ABOVE.
HILLENBRAND

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TELEGRAM

Z 192327Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS FLASH 5465
RUEHCR/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK FLASH 3996
BT
S E C R E T STATE 208156

CONTROL 5745Q
RECD: 19 OCT 73 11PM

Wor

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER)
SUBJECT: TRAVEL PLANS

FOR AMBASSADOR SCALI AND RUMSFELD FROM SECRETARY

1. I WANT YOU TO HAVE ADVANCE NOTICE THAT I WILL BE LEAVING FOR MOSCOW AT MIDNIGHT TONIGHT AT THE INVITATION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. I BELIEVE OUR DISCUSSIONS HAVE ADVANCED TO THE POINT WHERE THIS KIND OF AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION WOULD BE HELPFUL AT THIS STAGE. OUR EFFORTS CONTINUE TO BE TO TRY TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON A CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION IN PLACE AND A COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE PARTIES TO START TALKS IMMEDIATELY UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES LOOKING TOWARD A FUNDAMENTAL SETTLEMENT.

2. YOU WILL, OF COURSE, BE GETTING MANY INQUIRIES, BUT I WOULD ASK YOU TO PLAY THIS IN A VERY LOW KEY BECAUSE EXPECTATIONS WILL ALREADY BE VERY CONSIDERABLE AND WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT ADD TO THEM.

3. I WANT AMBASSADOR SCALI TO GIVE SYG WALDHEIM ADVANCE NOTICE. WE EXPECT FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS TO BE MADE ABOUT 2:30 A.M. BY ZIEGLER FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. SCALI SHOULD INFORM WALDEIM AT ABOUT MIDNIGHT. WE WILL HAVE INFORMED THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SC HERE AS WELL AS THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA SO THAT RUMSFELD MAY INFORM OTHER MEMBERS OF NATO COUNCIL ABOUT 30 MINUTES BEFORE EXPECTED 2:30 A.M. ANNOUNCEMENT WASHINGTON TIME.
KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: TASK FORCE: JJSISCO
CLEARANCES: S/S-MR. PICKERING

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
S-MR. EAGLEBURGER

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Wor
TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 5697Q
RECD: 19 OCT 73 6PM

O P 192113Z OCT 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA NIACT IMMEDIATE 2247
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3990
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 207785

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TACS: PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER

FOR AMBASSADOR GREEN

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM SECRETARY TO PRIME
MINISTER AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY: QUOTE: DEAR MR PRIME
MINISTER:

I AM WRITING TO YOU AS A FRIEND, AND BECAUSE OF THE
CLOSE ALLIANCE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, TO SHARE WITH
YOU MY CURRENT VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.
AUSTRALIA HOLDS THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
IN THESE CRITICAL DAYS AS WE CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR WAYS
TO BRING THE HOSTILITIES TO AN END; FOR THIS REASON
PARTICULARLY, I WANT TO STAY CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH YOUR
GOVERNMENT AS THE SITUATION EVOLVES.

OUR OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN, AND REMAINS, TO BRING THE WAR TO
AN END IN CONDITIONS THAT WILL LEAD TO PROGRESS TOWARD
A PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE DO NOT WANT MERELY ANOTHER RESPITE
BETWEEN WARS. WARFARE IS A TRAGEDY IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES,
BUT THE TRAGEDY WILL BE AT LEAST MITIGATED IF THE CEASE-
FIRE CAN BE ACHIEVED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LEAD TO MEANING-
FUL NEGOTIATIONS ON A FUNDAMENTAL SETTLEMENT.

SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING ON OCTOBER 6, I HAVE BEEN

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TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- STATE 207785, OCT 19

IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH THE PARTIES AND VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION IN AN EFFORT TO FIND THE BASIS FOR A CEASEFIRE. IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS, WE SUGGESTED THAT THE LEAST DAMAGING OUTCOME WOULD BE A CEASEFIRE WITH BOTH SIDES RETURNING TO THE POSITIONS THEY HELD PRIOR TO THE OUT-BREAK OF FIGHTING. SUBSEQUENTLY, WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE FIGHTING WOULD BE PROLONGED, WE EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASEFIRE ON THE BASIS OF THE EXISTING DISPOSITION OF FORCES. IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON SUCH A PROPOSITION. NEITHER SIDE SEEMS DISPOSED TO END THE FIGHTING AT THE MOMENT, AND THEREFORE OUR EFFORTS HAVE NOT BORNE FRUIT AT THIS POINT. WE WILL NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE OUR INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, FOR NEITHER SIDE IS LIKELY TO BENEFIT FROM FURTHER FIGHTING, AND THE LONGER THE WAR THE GREATER THE RISKS.

IN THE MEANTIME, WE HAVE BEEN CONFRONTED WITH THE VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM POSED BY THE SOVIET AIRLIFT TO RESUPPLY THE ARAB ARMIES. IT HAD BEEN MY HOPE IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CONFLICT THAT BY MUTUAL EXAMPLE BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE GOVERNED BY RESTRAINT IN SHIPPING FURTHER ARMS TO THE TWO SIDES. BUT ON ABOUT OCTOBER 10, A MASSIVE AIRLIFT OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT BEGAN THAT, AT THE TIME OF MY WRITING THIS LETTER, HAS AMOUNTED TO ABOUT 500 FLIGHTS INTO CAIRO, DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD. SOVIET EQUIPMENT IS ALSO EN ROUTE TO THE ARAB BELLIGERENTS BY SEA. WE VIEW THIS SOVIET ACTION SERIOUSLY, AND WE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO BEGIN A RESUPPLY EFFORT OF OUR OWN IN ORDER TO AVOID HAVING THE MILITARY BALANCE TIPPED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. TO HAVE DONE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO REWARD SOVIET ADVENTURISM. WE WILL, NEVERTHELESS, ALSO CONTINUE OUR ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN PURSUING MORE RESTRAINED POLICIES AND DIPLOMATIC MOVES TO END THE WAR IN CONDITIONS OFFERING HOPE FOR PROGRESS TOWARD A FUNDAMENTAL SETTLEMENT.

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PAGE -3- STATE 207785, OCT 19

I HAVE GONE TO SOME LENGTH, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO DESCRIBE OUR PRESENT POLICIES AND CONCERNS BECAUSE I BELIEVE WE MAY YET HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE THAT WILL LEAD TO NEGOTIATIONS ON A PEACE SETTLEMENT. TO DO SO WILL REQUIRE SKILLFUL AND DETERMINED COORDINATION AMONG THOSE OF US WHO ARE DESIROUS OF ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT RATHER THAN EXCLUSIVELY PARTISAN OBJECTIVES. AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, AUSTRALIA WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY, AND I WANT AT THIS TIME TO ASSURE YOU OF

MY INTENTION TO CONSULT FULLY WITH YOU AND YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AS THE COUNCIL ATTEMPTS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE ISSUE.

WITH BEST PERSONAL WISHES,

SINCERELY,

HENRY A KISSINGER. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA/EGY:MSTERNER

APPROVED BY S/S:TR.PICKERING

CLEARANCES: NEA:ALATHERTON
EA/ANZ:LNOSER

NEA:JJSISCO

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S-M
S-S
PC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #43

A Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600 EDT, Oct. 19, 1973

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Military Situation

/N
PRS
WLG

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(LDX)
D (LDX)
A (LDX)
A (LDX)
/HO

The Syrian front has remained quiet as Israeli forces have moved to concentrate their efforts along the Canal. Though Israeli claims of having broken the back of the Syrian Army are probably exaggerated, they clearly have done enough damage to make the Syrians welcome this respite to reorganize and re-equip their forces. The Israelis report that 200 to 300 new tanks have been unloaded in Syrian ports but they do not seem very concerned. The Israelis are content for now to limit their Syrian operations to keeping the Syrian forces off balance while improving present IDF positions.

CCT
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The tank battle which raged on both banks of the Canal during October 18 continued into the night and is still inconclusive. Israeli forces, however, have managed to enlarge their bridgehead on the west bank of the Canal. The IDF now has about 200 tanks across the Canal and claims it has every intention of keeping them there if possible. The Israeli presence, if it can be maintained, is a major political counter to Egyptian forces on the east bank and a stepping stone for a major Israeli offensive.

The IDF claims that in addition to using the west bank task force for knocking out SAM sites, it now has the option of using this force to cut off Egyptian troops on the east bank or to drive toward Cairo. An IDF spokesman has stressed that the latter option is less desirable, but Israeli military planners may well decide that by pushing toward Cairo, this will force Egypt to withdraw units from the integrated defensive system it maintains along the Canal. This would make Israel's declared objective of destroying Egypt's army more easily obtainable. The

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GDS - DECLAS Dec. 31, 1981

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-2-

Israelis feel they have now turned the corner in the war and that the initiative on both fronts is now in Israel's hands. The smell of victory will not make Israel welcome a ceasefire.

The IDF reports there has been substantial fedayeen activity in the north which apparently originates from Lebanon. The Israelis have directed artillery fire into Lebanon but are not likely to waste their armed strength on pacifying the fedayeen at this time. However, Israel will probably not forget this irritant when its forces can be spared.

Soviet Union

Kosygin has left Cairo after an apparently inconclusive three-day visit. The Soviets appear to be hewing to their public position of full support for the Arabs but there is a hint in the Moscow press of concern over the war's impact on detente and Western news agencies speculate that Premier Kosygin had been urging a rapid ceasefire and settlement in Cairo. Gromyko has told the French Ambassador in Moscow that the core of Soviet Middle East policy is total Israeli withdrawal, but since neither the U.S. nor Israel are prepared for this, the prospects for ceasefire are dim. The French convey the impression, allegedly received from the Algerians after Boumediene's visit, that if the war led to a U.S.-USSR confrontation, the Soviets would blink first.

E and E

Cairo reports that the mood there is becoming increasingly anti-American. If the Israelis have indeed turned the corner, and particularly if they drive toward Cairo, we can expect the mood to turn ugly in several Arab countries. The chartered Greek ship arrived this morning in Alexandria to evacuate over 350 American tourists from Egypt.

Attack on Bank of America

The terrorists holding more than 20 hostages in the Bank of America offices in Beirut have been tentatively identified as being a gang of Lebanese criminals without any political affiliation rather than Palestinian fedayeen as was first thought. Press agencies report that several bombs have gone off in the Bank and that the blasts were

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SECRET/EXDIS

-3-

followed by exchange of fire between the terrorists and police. Some police have apparently moved into the building but it is not clear if they have stormed the upper floors where the terrorists are holding out.

DISPATCHED BY OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL <i>P. Peter Jones</i> DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET/EXDIS

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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PAGE 01 MADRID 06012 190946Z

13-S
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 SS0-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00

INRE-00 /031 W

021785

R 190848Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6987
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 6012

EXDIS
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SP, XF, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN COMMENT TO SPAIN ON MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

REF MADRID 6004

1. DURING MY INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER OCT 18
HE GAVE ME A SHORT INFORMAL NOTE WHICH HE SAID ORIGINATED
WITH SPANISH EMBASSY IN AMMAN AND WHICH HE WAS PASSING
TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AT THE REQUEST OF THE
JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT.

2. THE TRANSLATED NOTE STATES TEXTUALLY:
"OUR AMBASSADOR HAS RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM THE
JORDANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO ASK THE
SPANISH GOVERNMENT TO CLARIFY WITH THE UNITED STATES THE
FOLLOWING:

"THE ARAB OFFENSIVE AT THIS MOMENT DOES
NOT HAVE THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ANNIHI-
LATION OF ISRAEL, BUT SIMPLY THE RECOVERY
OF THE TERRITORIES ALLUDED TO IN
RESOLUTION 242."

THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT IS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED
THAT THIS BE KNOWN, SINCE THE ISRAELIS ARE
TRYING TO PRESENT THIS STRUGGLE AS A PROBLEM

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V.I.G. _____
WALSH _____

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MADRID 06012 190946Z

OF LIFE OR DEATH FOR ISRAEL, WITH THE OBJECTIVE
OF AROUSING GENERAL ANXIETY IN THE JEWISH WORLD
AND, IN PARTICULAR, CONCERN IN THE UNITED STATES,
ENLARGING IN THIS WAY THE VOLUME OF AID FROM
FROM WASHINGTON TO TEL AVIV."

3. FOREIGN MINISTER EMPHASIZED TO ME THAT IN PASSING
ME THIS MESSAGE HE WAS ACTING SOLELY AS AN INTERMEDIARY
AND HAD NO COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE JORDANIAN
MESSAGE.
RIVERO

NOTE BY OC/T: CYDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. SARROS S/S-O.

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SECRET 141

PAGE 01 STATE 207364

55
ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT=01 EUR=25 ISO=00 INR=10 CIAE=00 DODE=00 NSAE=00
NSCE=00 SSO=00 USIE=00 CCO=00 INRE=00 USSS=00 PM=07
H=03 L=03 NSC=10 PA=04 RSC=01 PRS=01 SPC=03 SS=20
ACDA=19 IO=14 /133 R

DRAFTED BY METF:MSTERNER:BDF
APPROVED BY METF:FMDICKMAN
INR/RNA: PSTODDARD
S/S=0 - MR. NEWLIN

017851

P R 190149Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T STATE 207364

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, PINS, LE, XF, UR
SUBJ: USSR EVACUATES DEPENDENTS
REF: BEIRUT 12264

WE HAVE NO SURE KNOWLEDGE OF REASONS THAT MAY LIE BEHIND THE SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN DECISION TO EVACUATE THEIR DEPENDENTS. OF THREE HYPOTHESES YOU PUT FORWARD, (C) STRIKES US AS MOST PROBABLE. THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTE USDAO TEL AVIV'S 181445Z REPORTING ZEIRA'S EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ABOUT INCREASE ISRAELIS HAVE DETECTED IN FEDAYEEN ACTION ACROSS LEBANESE BORDER AGAINST CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS. OTHER REPORTS ALSO INDICATE INCREASED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY DURING PAST FEW DAYS. SOVIETS PROBABLY GETTING SIMILAR REPORTS AND ESTIMATING THAT SOME ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST LEBANON HAS BECOME MORE LIKELY. KISSINGER

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 207386

15

ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ARA-16 EUR-25 EA-11 ISO-00 IO-14 PCH-08
INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
CCO-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01
PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 SCS-03 SCA-01 OPR-02 A-01
SY-10 AID-20 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01 INT-08
SCEM-02 SCI-06 USSS-00 OC-06 /249 R

DRAFTED BY METF:GNANDERSON:BDP

APPROVED BY METF:FMDICKMAN

S/S-O - MR. NEWLIN

018801

O R 190336Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH
AMCONSUL CURACAO BY POUCH
AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE BY POUCH

S E C R E T STATE 207386

INFORM CONSULS - VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XF

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION


INFORM CONSULS; KUWAIT POUCH MUSCAT, DOHA

1. FOLLOWING IS MIDDLE EAST SITUATION THROUGH EVENING
OCTOBER 18.

2. MILITARY SITUATION. LARGE-SCALE BATTLE IN SINAI CON-

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PAGE 02 STATE 207386

TINUED AS ISRAELIS WIDENED THEIR BRIDGEHEAD ON WEST BANK FOLLOWING A PENETRATION THROUGH THE CENTRAL SECTOR. SCANTY INFORMATION FROM CAIRO SUGGESTS GROWING EGYPTIAN DILEMMA AS SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF ISRAELI TANKS NOW ON WEST BANK ARE PRESSING TOWARD SAM AND ARTILLERY DEFENSES WHICH HAVE PROVIDED THICK UMBRELLA FOR EGYPTIAN FORCES EAST OF CANAL. ISRAELIS ARE INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT; THEY SAY THEY HAVE SHATTERED TWO STRONGEST EGYPTIAN DIVISIONS TO REACH CANAL AND HAVE SINCE DECISIVELY BEATEN OFF ALL ATTACKS ON FLANKS OF IDF BRIDGEHEAD. ALTHOUGH IDF CLAIMS EGYPTIANS LOSING THEIR ELAN, THERE PROBABLY FURTHER HEAVY FIGHTING AHEAD.

3. ISRAELI MINDEF DAYAN HAS STATED THAT MAIN ISRAELI PUSH IN SINAI HAS NOT YET OCCURRED, BUT HE PREDICTS AN END TO THE WAR "IN DAYS, NOT MONTHS OR YEARS." MEANWHILE, AN IDF SPOKESMAN SAYS THAT THERE ARE "HUNDREDS" OF FEDAYEEN NOW RAIDING NIGHTLY INTO ISRAEL FROM LEBANON AND HAS IMPLIED THAT AN ISRAELI STRIKE AGAINST LEBANON WILL BE FORTHCOMING, EVEN THOUGH IDF NOT "FREE TO DEAL WITH THEM NOW."

4. IN NAVAL ACTION, IDF REPORTED EGYPTIAN NAVAL RESISTANCE AS IT SHELLED PORT SAID AND ZAFARANA ON RED SEA. ISRAELIS EXPRESS SOME CONCERN, HOWEVER, ABOUT EGYPTIAN SUBMARINES LYING OFF HAIFA AND ASHDOD. EGYPTIAN DESTROYERS BLOCKADING ISRAELI SHIPPING AT ADEN REMAIN ON STATION. IN AIR, IDF HAS ADMITTED LOSING SEVERAL AIRCRAFT IN ATTACKS ON EGYPTIAN SAM SITES.

5. ALTHOUGH THE GOLAN FRONT REMAINS QUIET FOR TIME BEING, IDF CLAIMS ENOUGH TANKS ARE POURING OUT OF SOVIET SHIPS IN SYRIAN PORTS TO REARM TWO DIVISIONS.

6. U.S. CITIZENS. LAST U.S. TOURISTS STRANDED IN EGYPT ARE EXPECTED TO LEAVE CAIRO BY BUS MORNING OF OCTOBER 19 FOR ALEXANDRIA TO EMBARK ABOARD GREEK SHIP WHICH WILL TAKE THEM TO GREECE.

7. ARAB REACTION TO USG RESUPPLY. DESPITE BROAD COVERAGE IN ARAB MEDIA OF THE USG RESUPPLY EFFORT, CRITICISM CONTINUED TO BE MUTED. IN CAIRO PARTICULARLY, MODERATION OF PRESS COMMENTARY WAS NOTEWORTHY.

SECRET



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 207386

8. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT OF U.S. RESUPPLY EFFORT. JOINING IN SPONSORING RESOLUTION BY SENATOR HUMPHREY, SIXTY-SEVEN SENATORS PROPOSED TODAY THAT SENATE SUPPORT CONTINUED SHIPMENTS OF PHANTOM AIRCRAFT AND OTHER U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL. SIMILAR HOUSE RESOLUTION WAS COSPONSORED BY 220 OF 435 MEMBERS. SECDEF SCHLESINGER TOLD AFL/CIO THAT U.S. AIRLIFT TO ISRAEL NOW JUST UNDER 1000 TONS PER DAY.

9. OIL. ROYAL COMMUNIQUE IN RIYADH, NOTING EARLIER RESOLUTION OF OIL MINISTERS IN KUWAIT, ANNOUNCED THAT SAUDI GOVERNMENT REDUCING PRODUCTION FOR OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER IMMEDIATELY BY 10 PERCENT. ALSO STATES THAT OIL SALES TO U.S. WILL STOP WITHIN A FEW DAYS IF THERE IS NO MODIFICATION OF U.S. MIDEAST POLICY AND RESUPPLY EFFORTS. EMBASSY KUWAIT QUOTES OIL MINISTER ATIQUI AS SAYING KUWAITI PRODUCTION DECREASES WILL BE APPLIED FIRST TO U.S. BUT AFTERWARDS (PRESUMABLY WHEN THERE ARE NO FURTHER SHIPMENTS TO THE U.S.) TO ALL OTHER CONSUMERS. MEANWHILE, ABU DHABI HAS ANNOUNCED IT IS CUTTING OFF ALL OIL SHIPMENTS TO U.S.

10. BANK OF AMERICA BEIRUT INCIDENT. NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE WITH FOUR TERRORISTS HOLDING 20 OR MORE HOSTAGES, PERHAPS INCLUDING ONE AMERICAN, IN BEIRUT OFFICES OF BANK OF AMERICA (BOA). PARTICIPANTS IN NEGOTIATIONS ARE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR AND OFFICIALS OF BOA, LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. LEBANESE OFFICIALS EXPRESS INCREASING OPTIMISM OVER OUTCOME. BOA OFFICERS IN U.S. ARE IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN BEIRUT AND HAVE NOT REVEALED THE NATURE OF CONCESSIONS WHICH THEY MAY BE PREPARED TO MAKE. DEMANDS OF TERRORISTS REPORTEDLY REMAIN: (1) 10 MILLION DOLS RANSOM; (2) FREE PASSAGE TO ALGERIA; (3) PERHAPS RELEASE OF 7 UNIDENTIFIED POLITICAL PRISONERS IN LEBANON; (4) 7 NEW HOSTAGES INCLUDING BOA OFFICIALS.

11. KOSYGIN IN CAIRO. SEMI-OFFICIAL EGYPTIAN NEWS AGENCY HAS CONFIRMED THAT KOSYGIN IS IN CAIRO AND REPORTS HE HAS HAD 3 LONG MEETINGS WITH SADAT. KISSINGER
NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHES SUVA BANJUL CURACAO AND MARTINIQUE.

SECRET



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

SECRET 269

PAGE 01 STATE 207380

61
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY PM/ISO:HGHAGERTY:BDF
APPROVED BY METF:ALTHERTON
DOD/ISA - COL. BOWEN
EUR/IB - MR. RABENOLD
PM/ISO - MR. STODDART
NEA/IAI - MR. CLUVERIUS
S/S - MR. PICKERING
S/S-0 - MR. NEWLIN

O R 190327Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LISBON NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO COMUSFORAZ

SECRET STATE 207380

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, PO, XF
SUBJ: EL AL FLIGHTS VIA LAJES
REF: LISBON 3857

1. IN OUR JUDGMENT, APPROACHING GOP AT THIS TIME REGARDING
EL AL USE OF LAJES AFB IN THE AZORES FOR REFUELING THEIR
JETS CARRYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT IS NOT DESIRABLE. WE THINK
IT IS A POOR IDEA EVEN FOR THE ISRAELIS TO BROACH THE
SUBJECT TO THE PORTUGUESE NOW AND HOPE THEY CAN BE DIS-
SUADED FROM DOING SO. IDEA OF DISGUIISING EL AL AIR-
CRAFT WITH USAF MARKINGS IS NON-STARTER.

2. FOR TEL AVIV: YOU SHOULD TELL THE ISRAELIS WE HAVE
LEARNED OF THEIR PLANS TO REQUEST PORTUGUESE PERMISSION

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATNER _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SOFTENHELD _____
V. E. G. _____
WALSH _____

D/B



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SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 207380

FOR REFUELING EL AL CARGO FLIGHTS IN THE AZORES AND DOUBT THE WISDOM OF SUCH A PROPOSAL. WE BASE THIS ON OUR VIEW THAT THE PORTUGUESE HAVE BEEN STRETCHED ABOUT AS MUCH AS WE THINK THEY CAN AND IF THERE IS TO BE ANY FURTHER STRETCHING, IT SHOULD BE TO ENABLE US TO SUSTAIN OUR AERIAL RESUPPLY EFFORT VIA LAJES. WHILE WE CAN CERTAINLY APPRECIATE ISRAELI DIFFICULTIES AND CONCERNS AND WISH WE COULD BE OF HELP, WE BELIEVE ANY ATTEMPT AT THIS POINT TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO USE LAJES FOR EL AL WOULD RUN THE RISK OF OVERLOADING THE CIRCUIT, POLITICALLY AND PHYSICALLY. BECAUSE SUCH REQUEST COULD JEOPARDIZE OUR CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR LANDING RIGHTS, WE BELIEVE THIS PROPOSITION SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO THE PORTUGUESE AND HOPE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL NOT DO SO. WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED BEFOREHAND IF GOI DECIDES TO APPROACH PORTUGUESE.

3. FOR LISBON. YOU SHOULD TELL YOUR ISRAELI COLLEAGUE ABOUT OUR VIEWS AS EXPRESSED ABOVE AND OF OUR INTENTION TO STATE THEM IN TEL AVIV, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT HE WILL CHECK WITH HIS HOME OFFICE ONCE MORE BEFORE CARRYING OUT HIS INSTRUCTIONS. KISSINGER

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

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SECRET 265

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3

61
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 R

66613
DRAFTED BY:EUR:WSTABLER
APPROVED BY:EUR:GSSPRINGSTEEN
BTS-MR. PICKERING

018431

O 190332Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 207383

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, SP
SUBJECT: USE OF LAJES
REF: MADRID 5944, STATE 205807

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
~~KENNEDY~~ _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
~~SAUNDERS~~ _____
~~SOMMERFELD~~ _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

D/E

1. FOREIGN MINISTRY'S PRESS STATEMENT REPORTED REFTEL IS NOT HELPFUL AND CERTAINLY GRATUITOUS IN ITS REFERENCES TO THE USE OF LAJES. THE STATEMENT GIVES ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS TO THE POSITION SET FORTH IN STATE 205807, AND GOS SHOULD BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS AS THIS ONE ARE ENCOMPASSED IN THAT PORTION OF STATE REFTEL WHICH READS "POSITIONS AND ATTITUDES WHICH GOS MAY TAKE AT THIS TIME CANNOT HELP BUT HAVE AN EFFECT ON OUR FUTURE RELATIONS".

KISSINGER

wow

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TELEGRAM

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 AF-10 IO-14 CIAE-00

DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSD-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01

SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 EB-11 SCEM-02 SCI-06 INT-08

TRSE-00 OMB-01 SR-02 ORM-03 AID-20 DRC-01 /209 W
***** 021543

seen
O R 190655Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7609
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION OECD PARIS
USMISSION OECD BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 13617

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, JA
SUBJ: ARAB APPROACH TO JAPAN ON ME

SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS FROM TEN ARAB STATES COLLECTIVELY CALLED ON FONMIN OHIRA OCTOBER 19 AND DELIVERED NOTE VERBALE URGING JAPAN TO TAKE POSITIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE AND OUTSPOKEN STAND ON ME CONFLICT. ACCORDING FONOFF SOURCE OHIRA EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ARAB POSITION AND SAID HE WOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER ARAB REQUESTS. OHIRA ALSO ASKED FOR ARAB UNDERSTANDING OF JAPANESE POSITION. END SUMMARY.

1. NINE AMBASSADORS AND CHARGE FROM ARAB STATES

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COLLECTIVELY CALLED ON FOMIN OHIRA MORNING OF OCTOBER 19
TO DELIVER NOTE VERBAL ON ME SITUATION AND TO DISCUSS
JAPANESE POSITION.

2. PAGE AND ONE HALF NOTE VERBAL CONTAINED FOLLOWING FOUR
POINTS (ACCORDING JIBIKI, DEPUTY HEAD FONOFF ME DIV,
WHO INTERPRETED AT SESSION):

A. ISRAEL HAS IN PAST HAD AGGRESSIVE POLICIES AND HAS
NOT HEEDED INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION IN ITS REFUSAL
TO RETURN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AS A RESULT, THE
PRESENT ME CONFLICT HAS BEGUN.

B. ALL ARAB REPRESENTATIVES IN TOKYO WISH TO CONVEY
THE PRESENT GOJ POLICY ON ME SITUATION TO THEIR
RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

3. THE ARAB NATIONS ASK JAPAN TO CLARIFY ITS POSITION
QTE ON THESE EVENTS UNQTE. THE ARAB NATIONS HOPE
JAPAN'S POSITION WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH TRADITION
AND THE QTE LOFTY UNQTE POSITION WHICH JAPAN HAS
MAINTAINED AIMED AT SETTLING THE ME PROBLEM IN A
PEACEFUL AND EQUITABLE WAY.

4. THE ARAB NATIONS WISH THE GOJ TO TAKE A POSITIVE,
CONSTRUCTIVE, AND OUTSPOKEN STAND IN SUPPORT OF THE
COUNTRIES WHO WISH TO REGAIN THEIR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

2. ACCORDING TO JIBIKI, OHIRA REPLIED THAT GOJ DEEPLY
CONCERNED ABOUT SITUATION WHICH ARAB COUNTRIES FACING.
OHIRA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD POSITION WHICH AMBASSADORS WERE
CONVEYING TO HIM. OHIRA EXPRESSED HOPE FOR CEASEFIRE
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND SAID JAPAN'S ATTITUDE WAS TO
ABIDE BY UN RES 242. OHIRA THEN REFERRED TO LETTER
JAPANESE UN PERMREP SAITO HAD SENT TO UN SEC GEN WALDHEIM
OCTOBER 17 (SEE USUN 4016 FOR TEXT) AND ADDED JAPAN
PREPARED TO EXTEND ITS OVERALL COOPERATION TO UN
ACTIVITIES RE ME CONFLICT.

3. OHIRA THEN SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD REQUEST IN NOTE
VERBALE THAT GOJ TAKE CONSTRUCTIVE AND OUTSPOKEN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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POSITION RE ME CONFLICT AND WOULD EXTEND QTE OVERALL
UNQTE COOPERATION TO SETTLE THE PROBLE. ALSO SAID
JAPAN PREPARED ASSIST IN UN OR RED CROSS EFFORTS RE REFUGEE
PROBLEM.
INGERSOLL

CONFIDENTIAL



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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 AF-10 IO-14 CCO-00 INRE-00
PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01
SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 OMB-01 EB-11 SCEN-02 SCI-06
INT-08 TRSE-00 SR-02 ORM-03 AID-20 DRC-01 /209 W
***** 021540

O R 190655Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7610
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION OECD PARIS
USMISSION OECD BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 143

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 13617

4. OHIRA THEN NOTED JAPANESE DEPENDENCY ON ARAB NATIONS FOR OIL SUPPLIES AND HIS APPRECIATION FOR STABLE OIL SUPPLIES TO DATE. IF AS RESULT OF ME WAR, OHIRA SAID, OIL SUPPLY CUT OFF OCCURS, JAPAN WILL BE FACED WITH SERIOUS SITUATION. OHIRA ASKED FOR COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING ON PART OF ARABS, AND SAID GOJ ON ITS SIDE INTENDS TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHAT IT SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT DO IN RESPONSE TO ARAB NOTE.

5. ACCORDING TO JIBIKI, SAUDI AMBASSADOR (WHO AS DEAN OF ARAB DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN TOKYO DID ALL TALKING ON BEHALF OF ARAB SIDE) SAID HE HIGHLY APPRECIATED OHIRA'S EXPRESSION OF UNDERSTANDING FOR ARAB POSITION AND ASKED THAT GOJ CONVEY RESULTS OF

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5



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ITS CON-

SIDERATION OF NOTE VERBAL TO AMBASSADORS PRESENT. S.A. AMBASSADOR FURTHER SAID HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM JIDDA ON OIL SUPPLY TO JAPAN, BUT QTE ACCORDING TO DISPATCHES UNQTE OPEC ACTION WOULD HAVE NO INFLUENCE IN JAPAN.

6. ARAB AMBASSADORS PRESENT FOR MEETING WITH OHIRA WERE FROM ALGERIA, IRAQ, EGYPT, QATAR, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, SUDAN, LEBANON, AND MOROCCO. LIBYAN CHARGE ALSO PRESENT.

7. JIBIKI ALSO NOTED THAT PM TANAKA HAD RECEIVED PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM GOLDA MEIR ON OCTOBER 16. 3 PAGE LETTER LARGELY DEVOTED TO ISRAELI SEARCH FOR PEACE OVER YEARS. LETTER CONCLUDED QTE WE FEEL THAT ISRAEL HAS EVERY REASON TO HOPE FOR THE SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING OF ALL PEACE LOVING NATIONS. THE INTERESTS OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INDIVISIBLE FROM PEACE IN THE WORLD, SURELY CANNOT BE SERVED BY ADHERENCE TO THE CAMP OF THOSE WHO HAVE CHOSEN WAR UNQTE.

8. OHIRA GAVE PRESS CONFERENCE SHORTLY AFTER CALL BY ARAB AMBASSADORS. KYODO WIRE SERVICE REPORT HIGHLIGHTS OHIRA'S REPORTED COMMENT THAT SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD HIM OF HIS BELIEF THAT JAPAN QTE WOULD NOT BE INCONVENIENCED UNQTE BY ARAB OIL PRODUCING NATIONS' NEW OIL STRATEGY. AT PRESS CONFERENCE OHIRA APPARENTLY MADE NO STATEMENT WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED AS RESPONSE TO ARAB REQUEST FOR OUTSPOKEN STAND ON ME.

9. FIRST SECRETARY OF LEBANESE EMBASSY TOLD EMBOFF AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 19 OHIRA HAD PROMISED ARAB AMBASSADORS THAT THEIR REQUEST WOULD BE TAKEN UP AT CABINET MEETING EVENING OF OCTOBER 19. ALSO NOTED THAT EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR HAD HAD BILATERAL MEETING WITH OHIRA AT SOME (UNSPECIFIED) TIME BEFORE TODAY'S SESSION TO QTE PRESSURE UNQTE JAPAN TO ABANDON ITS NEUTRAL POSITION AND TO SUPPORT PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN ME BASED ON WITHDRAWAL TO PRE 1967 LINES.

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10. COMMENT: EMBASSY TOOK INITIATIVE OCT 17 TO
PASS FONOFF SUBSTANCE OF STATE 203685 (BASIC GUIDANCE ON
US POSITION ON ME SITUATION). WE DID SO MINDFUL OF
DEPARTMENT'S STRICTURES THAT THIS POSITION SHOULD NOT
BE REVEALED UNTIL DEPT SPOKESMAN HAD SPOKEN TO MATTER
OF US RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL. WHEN THIS HAD OCCURRED, WE
ACTED BECAUSE WE WERE ANXIOUS THAT GOJ HAVE AUTHORITATIVE
STATEMENT OF OUR POSITION ON ME CONFLICT. WE ARE
HOPEFUL THAT OHIRA HAD OUR POSITION IN MIND AT TIME
OF MEETING WITH ARAB REPS.
INGERSOLL

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 999

PAGE 01 BONN 15155 191134Z

43
ACTION SS-30

03

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

O 191114Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8155

SECRET BONN 15155

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: GW, US, IS, MASS
SUBJECT: PROPOSED FRG PRESS LINE ON US RESUPPLY OF
ISRAEL

REF: (A) BONN 150381; (B) STATE 206403

1. FONOFF EXPRESSED APPRECIATION MORNING OCT. 18 FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S QUICK RESPONSE ON A PROPOSED PRESS LINE ON US RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL (REF B). HOWEVER, IN LATER HIGH-LEVEL MEETING THE SAME DAY, STATE SECRETARY FRANK DECIDED THE FRG PRESS LINE SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THE FOLLOWING: QUOTE: THE RESUPPLY EFFORT IS A US OPERATION. AT THE REQUEST OF THE FRG, THE US GOVERNMENT PROVIDED US WITH INFORMATION. FURTHER INFORMATION SHOULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. END QUOTE. FRANK CONSIDERED THAT NO OTHER COMMENTS SHOULD BE MADE BY FRG SPOKESMEN IN ORDER TO HEAD OFF ANY OTHER INQUIRIES FOR DETAILS.

2. ON SEPARATE TOPIC, WE WERE INFORMED THAT FONMIN SCHEEL IS EXPECTED TO FOLLOW THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REMARKS HE MADE TO THE AMBASSADOR OCT. 16 IN RESPONDING TO ARAB QUESTIONS ON EQUIPMENT SHIPMENTS AND NOT GO BEYOND THE PROPOSED PRESS LINE.

02306 ANDERSON

HOLDRIDGE

HORMATS

JORDEN

KENNEDY

LEHMAN

LEVINE

NEGROPONTE

ODEEN

RATLIFF

RONDON

SAUNDERS

SONNENFELDT

V. I. G.

WALSH

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

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3. UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT PERCEIVES OBJECTIONS, WE PLAN TO FOLLOW THE SAME GENERAL LINE ON PRESS INQUIRIES WHICH WE RECEIVE AS THAT SET FORTH IN REF A. WE PROPOSE TO STATE THAT THE US IS RESUPPLYING ISRAEL FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES AND THAT A LIMITED AMOUNT OF THE MATERIAL BEING USED FOR THE RESUPPLYING OPERATION IS COMING FROM THE US DEPOTS IN THE FRG. WE WOULD ANSWER NO COMMENT TO ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE SHIPMENTS OR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING QUESTIONS WHETHER OR NOT AIRCRAFT CONSTITUTE SOME OF THE MATERIAL BEING TRANSFERRED. WE WILL ALSO STATE THAT WE INFORMED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF OUR ACTIONS AND THAT WE UNDERSTAND IT WILL BE REPLACED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WILL STATE THAT NO US TROOPS HAVE BEEN MOVED FROM GERMANY AND THAT NONE HAVE BEEN PLACED ON ALERT IN FRG AS A RESULT OF THE WAR.

4. WE WILL USE THE FOREGOING ONLY IN ANSWER TO SPECIFIC INQUIRIES AND ONLY AFTER THE FRG PRESS SPOKESMEN USE THE PRESS LINE IN PARA 1 ABOVE. ASSUMING DEPARTMENT CONCURRENCE, WE WILL INFORM EUCOM, USAF AND USAREUR TO REFER ALL PRESS INQUIRIES ON THE SUBJECT TO THE EMBASSY FOR RESPONSE AS ABOVE.

5. DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS REQUESTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE EXPECT THE FRG PRESS LINE TO BE SURFACED AT AN 1130 CET PRESS CONFERENCE OCTOBER 19 AND WE HOPE TO BE IN A POSITION TO ANSWER PRESS INQUIRIES SHORTLY THEREAFTER.
HILLENBRAND

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Price increase explained -

was 19 Oct

01

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

PRIORITY /ROUTINE
ESA990REA629
DE RUEBUE #229 / 2921645
P R 191551Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4128

INFO AMEMBASSY JDEA 5467
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4243
AMCONSUL DHAHRAH 1759

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 12229
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ENRG, DPIC, ME

SUBJECT: PETROLEUM: GULF PRICE INCREASE EXPLAINED

REF: KUWAIT 37 4

1. IN VIEW MEDIA CONFUSION OVER WHETHER UNILATERAL GULF OIL PRICE INCREASE IS 17, 66 OR 70 PER CENT, INFOFF OBTAINED FOLLOWING EXPLANATION FROM WELL INFORMED SOURCE LAST ECONOMIC SURVEY NEWS EDITOR IAN SYMOND WHO JUST RETURNED FROM KUWAIT (PLEASE PROTECT).

2. INCREASE APPLIES TO POSTED PRICES AND IS ACROSS-THE-BOARD 70 PER CENT ON OCT. 1 POSTED PRICES. TRUE EFFECT OCT. 16. FOR ARABIAN LIGHT BARREL, NEW POSTED PRICE IS \$6.118 (VS \$3.600) AT GULF. IF INCREASE APPLIES LATER, \$7.142 (VS \$4.205).

3. HEREAFTER POSTED PRICES WILL BE MAINTAINED AT CONSTANT 40 PER CENT MARGIN OVER REALIZED PRICES. CHANGES WILL BE TRIGGERED BY 1 PER CENT VARIATION REALIZED PRICES, WHICH? APPARENTLY ARE WHAT THE MINISTERS DECIDE THEY ARE. NOT CLEAR HOW OFTEN PRICES WILL BE REVISED, POSSIBLY EVERY THREE MONTHS. FOR A START, MINISTERS DECIDED REASONABLE REALIZED PRICE FOR ARABIAN LIGHT AT GULF AT PRESENT IS \$3.65. THEY REPORTEDLY REVIEWED MIDEAST, INDOONESIAN, VENEZUELAN AND OTHER PRICES AND NETTED THEM BACK TO THE GULF.

4. SHOULD COMPANIES REJECT THESE UNILATERAL INCREASES,

*****WHISK COMMENT*****

ALSO CIEP, SCEN

PSN:012209

PAGE 01

TRK:293/17:49Z

DTG:191551Z OCT 73

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COMMUNIQUE SAYS, "PRODUCING COUNTRIES" WILL OFFER THE OIL TO BUYERS WILLING PAY NEW PRICES. SOURCE SURPRISES CO-OPERATIVE COMPANIES WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE ABANDONED THEIR OIL AND CONCESSIONS, BUT HE NOT CLEAR ON JUST GOVERNMENTS WOULD ACQUIRE CLEAR OWNERSHIP OF SUCH OIL.

5. SOURCE SAYS MINISTERS COMMUNIQUE WAS EXTREMELY CONFUSING AND NON-SPECIALIZED MEDIA REPS PRESENT IN KUWAIT SIMPLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND IT. INITIAL AND ERRONEOUS REPORT THAT INCREASE IS 17 PER CENT ATTRIBUTED TO SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CURRENT SPOT PRICE OF \$3.10 FOR ARABIAN LIGHT AND MINISTERS DECISION THAT CURRENT REALIZED PRICE IS \$3.65.

6. AS OF OCT. 19, BEIRUT MARKETERS HAD NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED OF INCREASES.

BUFFUM

BT

PSN:012209

PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:293/17:42Z

110:191551Z OCT 73

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OP IMMED /ROUTINE
ESA664AAA268
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3371
USMISSION USUN 2240

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 3181

ED 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EG IS
SUBJECT: HEYKAL ON EGYPT'S GOALS *

1. HEYKAL'S OCTOBER 18 EDITORIAL IS DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO QUESTIONING
OF ISRAELI THEORY OF SECURITY: IS IT RIGHT OR WRONG? ARABS,
HEYKAL STATES, WANT TO PROVE THE LATTER, WHILE ISRAEL WANTS
TO PROVE SECURITY THEORY CORRECT.

2. HEYKAL STATES ISRAEL MUST TAKE TWO CONSIDERATIONS INTO
ACCDUNT: ISRAEL IS AN ISLAND IN AN ARAB SEA, AND ENCIRCLED;
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION DOES NOT GUARANTEE A POWER
BALANCE IN HER FAVOR. ISRAELI SECURITY THEORY IS BASED ON
FOLLOWING PRECEPTS: (A) OVERWHELMING MILITARY SUPERIORITY;
(B) AN UNBEATABLE ARMY; (C) AN ARMY FOREVER WITH INITIATIVE
IN ITS HANDS AND CAPABLE OF CARRYING WAR INTO ARAB TERRITORY;
(D) WHEN WAR COMES, IT MUST BE A BLITZKRIEG BECAUSE FOR
ISRAEL TOTAL MOBILIZATION BECOMES INTOLERABLE AFTER BRIEF
PERIOD; (E) ISRAELI QUALITY MUST BE ABLE TO CANCEL ARAB
QUANTITY; (F) ISRAEL MUST FROM TIME TO TIME STRIKE FEAR
INTO HEARTS OF ARABS. HEYKAL NOTES HERE THE TRAP ISRAELIS
SET FOR SYRIAN AIR FORCE AT TARTUS IN SEPTEMBER. FINALLY,
ISRAEL MUST BE ABLE TO DEPEND ON A GREAT POWER. ISRAEL
CONSTANTLY ASKS, IS US WITH HER OR NOT? ✓

3. HEYKAL STATES THAT TO FACE ISRAEL ARABS MUST: (A) BE PRE-
PARED TO FACE OVERWHELMING ISRAELI SUPERIORITY; (B) CARRY
OUT A TWO-FRONT WAR; (C) TAKE INITIATIVE AND SURPRISE

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ISRAELIS; (D) WAGE EXTENDED WAR; (E) IMPROVE QUALITATIVELY;
(F) PASS THROUGH "BARRIER OF FEARS;" (G) AND PLACE US UNDER
IMMENSE PRESSURE.

4. HEYKAL TURNS TO FUTURE: CAN ISRAEL RECOVER FROM PRESENT
SITUATION? NOT EASILY, HE IMAGINES. ISRAELI SECURITY THEORY
DOES NOT DEPEND ON TERRITORY, BUT IS PHILOSOPHY OF ENTIRE
COMMUNITY. HEYKAL CALCULATES THAT ISRAELI REACTION WILL BE
ONE OF SHOCK AT WHAT HAPPENED, FEAR AT WHAT MIGHT HAVE
HAPPENED HAD WAR BEGUN ON ISRAELI FRONTIER, ANGER AT ISRAELI
LEADERS FOR BEING TAKEN BY SURPRISE (HEYKAL STATES DAYAN'S
FUTURE MAY BE ENDED), CONCERN OVER FUTURE IMMIGRATION AND
OVER WORLD IMAGE OF ISRAEL DAVID IN FACE OF ARAB GOLIATH.

5. HEYKAL STATES THAT IF ONE BASE OF ISRAELI
SECURITY THEORY FAILS, THEN ALL BASES FAIL. EVEN US/ISRAELI
RELATIONS WILL EXPERIENCE A RADICAL CHANGE. HEYKAL STATES
NOT MANY ISRAELIS COULD HAVE BEEN PLEASED BY PRESIDENT NIXON'S
REMARKS ABOUT US POLICY IN ME TODAY BEING SIMILAR TO US POLICY
IN LEBANON IN 1958 AND JORDAN IN 1970.

6. IN SHORT, ISRAEL WILL FIND IT IN ITS INTEREST
TO STOP FIGHTING IN ORDER TO REGROUP HERSELF AND LAUNCH
ANOTHER ATTACK. HER PURPOSE WILL NOT BE MERELY TO REGAIN
GOLAN OR EAST BANK OF CANAL, BUT TO SAVE HER THEORY
OF SECURITY. HEYKAL CONCLUDES WITH REITERATION THAT AIM OF
THIS PRESENT STAGE IS TO STRIKE AT THIS THEORY, BY SHAKING
THE MILITARY INSTITUTION, PROVING ISRAELI WAR MACHINERY TO
BE DEFECTIVE, AND TEARING OFF ISRAEL'S MASK OF ARROGANCE.

7. COMMENT: HEYKAL'S ARTICLE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN
BEFORE CURRENT ISRAELI ARMORED OFFENSIVE IN SINAI. HE
NEVERTHELESS PREPARES GROUND FOR EVENTUAL EGYPTIAN FALLBACK
SHOULD SUCH BE NECESSARY. SECONDLY, HE MAKES NO MENTION OF
EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES: IN MIDDLE OF ARTICLE HE
STATES THAT, TO ISRAEL, PRINCIPAL QUESTION IS WHAT WILL
PREVENT ARAB FROM GLIDING BEYOND JUNE 5 BOUNDARIES SHOULD THEY
GET SO FAR, BUT HE DOES NOT ANSWER THIS QUESTION. FINALLY,
HE IMPLIES THAT ISRAELI TRAP SET FOR SYRIAN AIR FORCE OFF
TARTUS ON SEPTEMBER 13 WAS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IN CONTRIBUTING
TO PRESENT HOSTILITIES.

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AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1089

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 4055

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFDR, UN, XF
SUBJ: ZAYYAT STATEMENT TO WED GROUP

1. SUMMARY: EGYPTIAN FONMIN ZAYYAT ADDRESSED WED GROUP EARLY EVENING OCT. 18, DAY AFTER EBAN HAD STATED ISRAEL'S CASE TO SAME GROUP (USUN 4007). ZAYYAT OUTLINED EGYPTIAN CONDITIONS FOR PEACE AND GAVE ARAB VERSION OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO PRESENT HOSTILITIES, WITH HEAVY EMPHASIS ON US RESPONSIBILITY. PRESENTATION WAS NOT VINDICTIVE, BUT STRAIGHTFORWARD AND EFFECTIVE IN ITS TONE OF APPARENT SINCERITY. END SUMMARY.

2. ZAYYAT BEGAN BY REVIEWING ME SITUATION AS SEEN BY ARABS JUST PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER, MANY ARAB FONMINS VISITED WASHINGTON AFTER HAVING SPOKEN BEFORE UN. NONE OF THEM SAW POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT IN ME, OR BELIEVED US POSITION HAD CHANGED.

3. BY THIS FALL AMERICAN POSITION WAS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL WITH THAT OF ISRAEL. IT HAD PASSED THROUGH SEVERAL STAGES: FIRST US, IN 1967, STRONGLY SUPPORTED LA DRAFT

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RES ON ME, WHICH CALLED FOR ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL BEHIND JUNE 5, 1967 LINES. SECOND, IN FEBRUARY 1971 JARRING AIDE MEMOIRE WAS ADVANCED, WHICH REFLECTED POINTS ADVANCED BY SECRETARY ROGERS. IN FOUR POWER TALKS' DECLARATION AS WELL, US SUPPORTED JARRING AIDE MEMOIRE AND URGED ISRAEL TO COOPERATE IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THIRD STAGE WAS US REPETITION OF EBAN'S ASSERTION THAT JARRING MEMORANDUM HAD BECOME "AN IMPEDIMENT TO PEACE". AT THIS FINAL STAGE US INSISTED ON NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL, AND FINALLY IN JULY VETOED RES SUPPORTED BY REST OF SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WAS AT THIS POINT, ZAYYAT SAID, THAT EGYPT REALIZED IT COULD NOT HOPE FOR ASSISTANCE FROM US OR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

4. IN CONTRAST TO AMERICAN POLICY, ZAYYAT CONTINUED, EGYPTIAN POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. ALTHOUGH EGYPT DID REJECT LA DRAFT BECAUSE IT CONTAINED OTHER UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS, SHE SUBSEQUENTLY ACCEPTED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF US POLICY AS SET FORTH IN JARRING MEMORANDUM. FINALLY, WHEN MEMORANDUM WAS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE, EGYPT CAME TO COUNCIL THIS PAST SUMMER. THIS WAS EGYPT'S FINAL APPEAL TO WORLD COMMUNITY--"A CRY OF CONSCIENCE TO EVERY EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI CHILD WHO WAS GOING TO BE KILLED," EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEMBERS OFFERED A MESSAGE OF JOY AND HOPE, AN ALTERNATIVE TO EGYPT'S "CRAWLING ON ITS HANDS AND KNEES." THEN CAME US VETO, A DECISION WHICH REFLECTED ISRAEL'S DETERMINATION TO GAIN MILITARY SOLUTION. EGYPT'S ANSWER WAS THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH SETTLEMENT.

5. ZAYYAT RECAPITULATED FIVE PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT EARLIER SET FORTH BY SADAT. HE ADDED THAT ALL ARAB COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN PRESENT CONFLICT SHARED THESE PRINCIPLES. TO THIS, FORMINS OF ALGERIA, LEBANON, TUNISIA AND JORDAN, WHO HAD ASKED TO ATTEND MEETING, NODDED THEIR ASSENT. ZAYYAT SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO SADAT'S FIVE POINTS, EGYPT WAS READY TO BE BOUND BY ALL PAST UN RESES AS WELL AS ALL THOSE TO COME. HOWEVER, LANGUAGE OF RESES MUST BE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS.

6. ZAYYAT CONCLUDED BY SAYING EGYPT WANTED PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE--PEACE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL JUSTICE IN HER OWN COUNTRY, INDEPENDENCE IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

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